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In the Supreme Court ofthe State of Idaho 
MARKVAN, ) 
) 








ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011 
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053 
RESPONDENT PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA M. OLSSON IN SUPPORT OF PMC'S MOTION 
TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were filed by counsel for Respondent on July 2, 2013. Therefore, 
good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed 
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped October 17, 2005; 
2. Judgment, file-stamped November 9, 2007. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD be and hereby is, DENIED in part, without prejudice, as the documents listed below do not 
bear a legible file stamp. 
1. · Answer to Complaint. 
2. Memorandum Decision and Order 
DATED this ~day of July, 2013. 
AUG ATIONRE 
cc: Counsel ofRecord 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RE RD ~ oc et o:i.: 7-3 =:::87::::9~3-:::::2:::0 =..:11======~~::;::;~~:=;:;:::============================== 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
MARK VAN, ) 
) 








ORDER GRANTING RENEWED 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011 
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053 
RESPONDENT PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S RENEWED MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF JETTA HATCH MATHEWS IN SUPPORT OF 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were 
filed by counsel for Respondent on July 9, 2013. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S RENEWED MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and the augmentation record shall include 
the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Answer to Complaint, file-stamped April 11, 2006; and 
2. Memorandum Decision, Order and Judgment, file-stamped October 31, 2007. 
DATED this IJ- day of July, 2013. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel ofRecord 




Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055 
Paul D. McFarlane, ISB No. 7093 
MOFFATT, 'THOMAS, BARRETT, RoCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 1 Otb Floor 
P. 0. Box 829 






Attorneys for Defendants 
f-r ;,:·,, 
.' ' ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MARK. VAN, 
Case No. CV 2005-4053 OC 
Plaintiff, 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
.r,. 
vs. 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, PAT 
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, 
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director, 
GARY ALZOIA, Director of Operations, 
RON FERGIE, ChiefPilot/Safety Officer, 
BARRY NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES I-X, 
r.-t-a.. $ sz..O() fd~ 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the defendants, PortneufMedical Center (''PMC'), Pat Hennanson, 
-. . 
Hospital Administrator ("Hennanson"), Pam Humphrey, EMS Program Director ("Humphrey''), 
Gary Alzola, Director of Operations ("Alzola"), Ron Fergie, ChiefPilot/Safety Officer 
..Jo 
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("Fergie"), and Barry Nielson, Pilot ("Nelson") (collectively, "Defendants"), by and through 
undersigned colUlSel, and answer plaintiff Mark Van's ("Plaintiff') Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ("Complaint") as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint, and each and every count therein, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's 
Complaint that is not specifically and expressly admitted herein. 
PARTIES 
1. The answering Defendants admit Paragraphs I, II, ill, N, V, VI, and Vll 
ofPlaintiffs Complaint. 
2. The anS\vering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraph Vffi of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
JURISDICfiON AND VENUE 
3. In response to paragraph IX ofPlaintiffs Complaint, the answering 
Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in 
their entirety. 
4. Paragraph X ofPlaintiffs Complaint calls for legal conclusions and, 
therefore, no response is required. Should the answering Defendants be required to respond, 
they would admit that jurisdiction and venue in this Court are proper. 
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FACTUAL BASIS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
5. In response to paragraph XI of Plaintiffs Complaint, the answering 
Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in 
their entirety. 
6. The answering Defendants admit Paragraph XII of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
7. The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraphs Xlll, XIV, XV, XVI, XVTI, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, and XXIV of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
COUNT I 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
8. In response to paragraph XXV of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering 
Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in 
their entirety. 
9. The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraph XXVI ofPlainti:ff's Complaint. 
COUNT IT 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
10. In response to paragraph XXVII of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering 
Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in 
their entirety. 
11. The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraph XXVIII of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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DAMAGES 
12. In response to paragraph XXIX of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering 
Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in 
their entirety. 
13. The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraphs XXX, XXXI, XXXll, and XXXJII of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
14. The answering Defendants deny Plaintiff's prayer for relief 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are time barred under Idaho Code section 6-2101, et seq. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff's claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions 
complained of, if and to the extent they occurred, were the lawful exercise of discretion and were 
undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because even if the 
Defendants' actions with respect to Plaintiff are subsequently determined to have been wrongful, 
the Defendants' actions were at all times based upon a reasonable, good-faith belief that such 
actions were lawful. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because Defendants' 
conduct in this matter was at all times privileged and based upon business necessity. 
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SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs action is barred, either in whole or in part, because Plaintiff's claims 
were processed through Defendant's internal complaint procedures and appropriate action was 
taken. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
The damages prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint and the cause of action alleged 
against the answering Defendants arise out of and stem from activities for which said Defendants 
are immune from liability by virtue of Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, and therefore, Plaintiff's 
cause of action and the damages alleged are barred by virtue of Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the terms of any 
employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was materially breached and repudiated 
by Plaintiff; therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to no relief upon any such contract. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Any claim based upon breach of contract and/or breach of any alleged implied 
covenant of such contract is barred to the extent Plaintiff has failed to fulfill any contractual 
conditions precedent. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was reciprocal, and any 
claims based upon a breach of such covenant are barred, either in whole or in part, because 
Plaintiff materially breached said covenant. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
The amounts the Plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits 
must be reduced and offset by any amounts (including unemployment insurance benefits) that 
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the Plaintiff earned or could have earned with the exercise of reasonable diligence during the 
period for which lost earnings are sought by the Plaintiff. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, by the equitable doctrines 
of either estoppel, waiver, laches, and/or unclean hands. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by failure to provide these answering Defendants 
with reasonable ~pportunity to cure any alleged breach of duty. 
FIFfEENTH DEFENSE 
IfPlaintiffhas sustained injuries or losses as alleged in the Complaint, upon 
information and belief, such injuries or losses were caused, in whole or in part, through the 
operation of other intervening and/or superseding cause or causes. 
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs alleged damages, if any, are limited, either in whole or in part, by the 
limitation of non-economic damages as provided by Idaho Code section 6-1603. 
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE 
Any recovery to which Plaintiff might otherwise be entitled in this action is 
subject to the provisions ofldaho Code section 6-1606 prohibiting double recoveries from 
collateral sources. 
EIGHTEENTIJ DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from recovery, in whole or in part, by his failure to mitigate 
damages. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 6 BOI_MT2:612127. t 
00659 
NINETEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims may be barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiff's own conduct, 
including, without limitation, his own contributory negligence. 
TWENTIETH DEFENSE 
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim for relief against answering Defendants 
for emotional distress and/or other damages arising out of any alleged physical or emotional 
injury or disability, or a claim for relief against answering Defendants for pwportedly causing 
his alleged physical or emotional injury or disability during the course and scope of his 
employment, Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by Idaho Code sections 72-201, 72-209 and 72-211, 
which are the exclusive remedy provisions of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, Idaho 
Code sections 72-101 -72-806. 
TWEN1Y-F1RST DEFENSE 
Defendants are entitled to recover their attorney's fees for their defense of 
Plaintiff's action pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and pursuant to 
Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are limited by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1981a(b). 
TWENTY-THIRD DEFENSE 
Discovery is ongoing in this matter and Defendants respectfully reserve the right 
to amend and/or supplement their answer as may be necessary. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The answering Defendants have been required to retain an attorney to defend this 
action and are entitled to recover their attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action 
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pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and any 
other applicable law. 
WHEREFORE, the answering Defendants pray: 
1. That Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint, and that the Complaint in 
this action be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2. For their costs and reasonable attorney fees; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper. 
DATED this 1Oth day of April, 2006. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETI, Roc 
~~~~D 
Patricia M. Olsson Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1Oth day of April, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David E. Gabert, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
845 West Center, Suite C 
Post Office Box 4267 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4267 
Facsimile (208) 232-8001 
(v{u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, PAT ) 
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, ) 
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director, ) 
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RON FERGIE, ChiefPilot!Safety Officer, BARRY) 




Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
ORDER and JUDGMENT 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This case comes before thls Court pursuant to a Motion for Reconsideration of Court's 
Order Gmnting Defendants' Motion for Protective Order ("Motion to Reconsider") filed by 
Mark Van ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Van'') and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Portneuf 
Medical Center ("PMC") and numerous named employee Defendants (hereinafter ''the 
Defendants") against the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider specifically seeks review of this Court's Order 
"prohibit[ing] Plaintiff :from conducting any further discovery as to Request for Production No. 
27 of Plaintiff's Second Set ofinterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents." 
(Mot. for Reconsid. of Court's Order Granting Defs.' Mot for Protective Order ("Mot. for 
Recons.", Sept. 10, 2007, 1.) Request for Production No. 27 sought "a copy of the Component 
Overhaul and Maintenance Program for the Life Flight Progmm ('COMP contract')." (Jd. at 2.) 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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The Defendants objected to this request "as overly broad, vague, unduly burdensome, not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and outside the scope of 
plaintiffs issues in the lawsuit." (/d.) The Plaintiff argues such objections are without merit 
because: 
The request was specific and limited in scope and certainly would not have been 
burdensome for Defendants to comply. Furthermore, the contract is absolutely relevant. 
It is critical for Plaintiff to have the document in order to establish one ofthe facets ofhis 
claim that Defendants did waste Bannock County taxpayers' money. 
(Id.) The Plaintiff argues this "Court's Order prohibiting disclosure of the COMP contract was 
not based on the merits, but was issued as a result of an error on the part of Plaintiff's previous 
counsel." (!d. at 3.) The Plaintiff's previous counsel failed to respond to or othenvise oppose 
the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. 
Pursuant to their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants are arguing that the 
Plaintiff's WIOngful temrination claims against the Defendants should be dismissed because the 
Plaintiff 
failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim within 180 days of his termination (as required by 
Idaho Code Section 6-906). Moreover, Van cannot show any public policy violated by 
PMC, cannot show that Van engaged in any protected activity under the state 
whistleblower statute, and cannot show any nexus between any such alleged conduct and 
his termination. Finally, Van's breach of conlract chriros should be dismissed, as he was 
an employee at will and not subject to an express or implied employment contract that 
specified the duration of employment. 
(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Sunun. J. ("'Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Aug. 3, 2007, 1 .) 
This Court heard oral arguments regarding the above matters on September 24, 2007, 
taking the motions under advisement. After receiving oral arguments and reviewing the entire 
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file, including the briefs filed by counsel, this Court enters the following Memorandum Decision 
and Order. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVlEW 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56( c). The 
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the 
party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 
(1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and 
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. 
Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). Ifthe evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 
434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non~moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted jn favor of the moving party when the 
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon 
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31~ 887 P.2d at 
1037-38; Badell v. Beek-;, 115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the 
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
Memorandum Decision aod Order 
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pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56( e) (emphasis 
added). 
ISSUES 
1. Whether to grant the Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Whether to grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
3. Whether the Defendants are entitled to costs and fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff began his employment with PMC on May 1, 1986, as a mechanic with the 
Life Flight program. On October 12, 1997, he became the director of maintenance of Life Flight 
and became responsible for the maintenance ofPMC's Life Flight helicopter. The Plaintiff was 
an at-wil1 employee. On November 14, 2001, the Life Flight helicopter crashed in the course of 
a rescue mission. The Plaintiff was a witness to that crash and rescued the pilot. The Plaintiff 
had worked on the helicopter prior to the crash, fixing a fuel transfer pump. Ultimately, the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the crash was caused by pilot error 
and was unrelated to maintenance issues. However, Mr. Van seemed to believe that the media 
blamed the crash on the maintenance department, and PMC refused to release information 
explaining to the media that the maintenance department was not responsible for the accident. 
By all accounts, Mr. Van's relationship with PMC management and the Life Flight pilots 
deteriorated following the crash, with the Plaintiff growing more frustrated and distrustful. In 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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August of2003, Mr. Van authored Life Flight Maintenance Policy No. 12, a document that 
portrays the Plaintiffs state of mind. Pertinent excerpts from that document follow: 
This leiter pertains to the release of aircraft to pilots after maintenance events. 
On 11114/01 our helicopter had an accident due to pj lot error. Life Flight 
Maintenance was blamed for the accident. The press release was Life Flight helicopter 
crashes after maintenance. I fought long and hard to get the NTSB report released. From 
this point forth we need to monitor the state of the pilots and question what they do, to 
avoid a repeat of that very bad situation! 
1t is apparent to me now, that the new Program Director, Director of Operations 
and the Chief pilot will shift the blame to Maintenance, even if they have infonnation that 
will clear Maintenance of any wrong doing. They will be dishonest with Administration 
to attain their end to cover for the pilots at any costs. J am sorry to say that we have an us 
against them scenario fostered by the aforementioned staff. 
[ am cordial with them and do not wish to foster a us against them situation but 
you must always remember that if it' s a decision they have to make (pilot against 
mechanic) you are going to take the hit. I have been striving to change this. I will 
continue to try until security escorts me off the property. They will gang up on you and 
make little to no sense to attain the end they desire. It has happened to me on 5 separate 
occasions. 
*** 
Since the powers that be conspired to shift the blame to our department for Tim's 
accident. [sic] I feel it is our responsibility to baby sit the pilots and question there [sic] 
fitness flight, or any other pilot activities that could cause a situation that could blacken 
our reputations or the programs. The only thing I could be guilty of with Tim's accident 
was letting him take off after I made my repairs. I will not in the future, let pilots fly 
away after maintenance if I feel the aircraft is at risk. I want you to cover your ass and 
follow this policy also. 
*** 
(Ex. F- Life Flight Maintenance Policy Letter 12, attached to Aff. of Paul D. McFarlane 
("McFarlane Aff."), Aug. 3, 2007.) Various meetings were held to discuss Mr. Van's concerns, 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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however, he continued to have issues with the management of Life Flight and felt his concerns 
went unresolved. In April of2005, another meeting was held to discuss Mr. Van's issues. After 
tbis meeting, Life Flight management and PMC officials conducted an investigation to gauge the 
viability of the Life Flight program and determined "[t]he [Life Flight) program was in a state of 
severe dysfunction due to Van's serious trust issues with pilots, his superiors, and others, and 
because he was unable to move on from the resolution of issues unless the resolution was 
entirely of his own making." (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 17.) Thereafter, on April 20, 2005, 
the Plaintiff was terminated. 
The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 17, 2005, alleging that he had been fired for 
reporting safety and operational violations and other misconduct of his fellow employees. (See 
Compl., Oct. 17,2005, 8.) Count I oftbe Complaint alleged wrongful termination of 
employment. Count II alleged breach of contract 
DISCUSSION 
A. Whether to grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1. Whether tbe Plaintiff must comply with tbe Idaho Tort Claims Act 
PMC first argues that the Plmntiff's ''wrongful termination claim js barred because he 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act." (Mem. in Supp. of 
Summ. J. at 20.) The Plaintiff disputes that claim, arguing that a public employee is not required 
to file a notice of tort claim in order to preserve his claims of wrongful termination under the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees (Whistle blower) Act. (Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J. 
("Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J. "), Sept. 11, 2007, 25-26.) The Plaintiff contends that lris "cause of 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy enunciated [in J the 
Whistleblower's Act is a contract action, not a tort action .... Furthermore, nothing in the 
Whistleblower's Act requires a claimant to file a Notice of Tort Claim." (Id. at 27.) Thus, 
because the Plaintiff argues his action for wrongful termination "is a contract action, no Notice 
of Tort Claim was necessary ... _, (Jd. at 28.) 
PMC is a governmental entity or political subdivision covered under the ITCA. Section 
6~906 of that Statute imposes a notice requirement for the filing of a claim against governmental 
entities. That section states in pertinent part: "All claims against a political subdivision arising 
under the provisions of this act ... shall be presented to and :fiied with the clerk or secretary of 
the political subdivision within. one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or 
reasonably should have been discovered. whichever is later." A "claim" is defined in JC § ~902 
as: 
any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its 
employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as 
compensation for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a 
governmental entity or its employee when acting within the course or scope of his 
employment. 
In turn. section 6-907 describes the contents of a claim: 
All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately 
describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or 
damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or 
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall 
contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a statement of the actual 
residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and :filing the claim and for a 
period of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose. .. _ A 
claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid or 
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause 
Memorandum Decision 11nd Order 
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of the claim, or otherwise, uDless it is shown that the governmental entity was in 
fact misled to its injury thereby. 
Pursuant to section 6-909, after a notice of claim is filed, the governmental entity has 90 days to 
approve or deny the claim. A claim is deemed denied if it is not approved or denied within that 
90~day period.1 A lawsuit in district court against the governmental entity is only permitted once 
a claim is denied? 
The purpose of the ITCA is to '(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an 
opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to 
conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent oftbe 
state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.' Cobb ley v. City of Challis, 
138 Idaho 154, 157, 59 P.3d 959, 962 (2002) (quoting Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 
Idaho 484,486, 887 P.2d29, 31 (1994)). "[T]he claim filing statute is usually the only sure and 
certain means by which the state or its subdivisions may be alerted to potential liability arising 
from a governmental activity.' Friel, 126 Idaho at 486, 887 P.2d at 31 (quoting Cook v. State, 83 
Wasb.2d 599,603,521 P.2d 725,728 (1974)). "The failure to file within theiTCA time 
limitation acts as a bar to any further action." Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 157, 59 P.3d at 962 (citing 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722,747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987)). 
1 6-909. Time for allowance or denial of claims- Effect of failure to act. • Within ninety {90) days after the 
filing of the claim against the governmental entity or its employee. the governmental entity shall act thereon and 
notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of 
the ninety (90) day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
2 6-916. Suit on denied claims permitted. If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an action is permitted by tbis act. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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As explained, the ITCA requires that 41(a]ll claims ... arising under the provisions of this 
act ... shall be presented to and filed with ... the political subdivision within one hundred (180) 
days from the date the claim arose" and that a lawsuit may not be instituted until a claim is 
denied. IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 6-906, 6-909-10 (2007). Compliance with the ITCA is mandatory 
for all claims, including those under the Whistleblower Act, because a "claim" under the ITCA is 
defined as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its 
employee which any person is legally entitled to recover ... as compensation for the negligent or 
otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee when acting within 
the course or scope of his employment." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-902(7) (2007). 
While the Plaintiff argues his claim for wrongful termination was brought under the 
public policy exception to at-will employment and is therefore an action in contract and not 
subject to the ITCA, liability under the Wbistleblower Act is not predicated on the breach of the 
employment at-will contract. The Whistleblower Act provides that an employee can bring an 
action for damages against his or her public employer. "Damages" is defined as "damages for 
injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter .... " IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2105(1),(2) 
(2007). Additionally, the language ofthe Whistleblower Act indicates that the Idaho Legislature 
intended to create a cause of action separate from the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine. Specifically, section 6·2101 explains that the Whistleblower Act was 
created to provide "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse action 
from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation." 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (2007). 
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The Plaintiff's wrongful temrination claims, including his whistleblower chrims, are 
covered under the Idaho Tort Claims Act since the Whistleblower Act created an action separate 
from the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and is not exempt from the 
notice requirements of the ITCA. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that PMC wrongfully 
terminated hls employment in violation of public policy and Idaho Code§ 6-2101, and, as a 
result, be suffered damages including lost wages and benefits, decreased earning capacity, 
relocation costs and emotional distress and suffering. (See Compl. at~~ XXVI, XXX.) The 
Plaintiffs empJoyment was terminated on April20, 2005. Thereafter, Mr. Van brought a 
"claim" for money damages against his public employer. Pursuant to IC § 6-906, he was 
required to ille a notice of claim with the hospital or the county clerk within 180 days. l1 is 
undisputed that the Plaintiff failed to comply with this notice requirement. As such, PMC was 
denied its opportunity to "conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to 
determine the extent of ... liability, if any, and ... prepare defenses." That is in violation of the 
purpose of the ITCA. Since "[t]he failure to file within the ITCA time limitation acts as a bar to 
any further action," the Defendants' request for summary judgment on the ground that the 
Plaintiff failed to honor the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is hereby GRANTED and 
the Plaintiffs tort claims, including his claims for emotional distress, are dismissed. 
2. Whether the Plaintiff's wrongful terminl!tion claim under IC § 6-2101 fails. 
PMC next argues that the Plaintiffs wrongful termination claim under IC § 6-2101 fails 
because the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he engaged in activity protected under the Act or 
that be was terminated because be reported government waste or violations of law. (Mem. in 
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Supp. ofSumm. J. at 24.) The Plaintiff maintains he was discriminated against for raising safety 
and waste issues. (Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J. at 29.) 
As explained, the Idaho Protection of Public Employees (Whistleblower) Act was 
enacted to provide a cause of action for public employees who suffer adverse action from their 
employer as a result of reporting waste and violation of a law, rule or regulation. IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 6-2101 (2007). In order to establish a prima facie case under the Wbistleblower Act, the 
public employee "must demonstrate he or she engaged or intended to engage in activity protected 
by the statute, be or she suffered an adverse employment action, and there is a causal connection 
between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action." Curlee v. Kootenai County 
Fire & Rescue, No. 32794, 2007 WL 1501383, at *4, (Idaho Ct. App. May 24, 2007). 
Idaho Code§ 6-21 04(1Xa) and (b) sets forth the activities that are protected under the 
Act relevant to this action3: 
3 IC § 6-2104 states in full: 
6-2104, Reporting of governmental waste or violation of law-Employer Action.-
(l X a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a person authorized 
to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good fuith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or 
manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a 
political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such communication shall be made at a time and in a manner 
whicb gives the employer reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (lXa) of this section. an empl~ee communicates in good faith if there is a 
reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably 
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or frivolous. 
(2) An employer may not take adverse actioo against an employee because an employee participates or gives 
information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of 
administrative review. 
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because tho employee has objected to or refused 
to carry out a ditective that the employee reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation adopted under the 
authority of the laws of this state, political subdivision of this state or the United States. 
(4) An employer may not imphmtent rules or policies that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to dm:ument 
the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation, or sus~ted violation of any laws, 
rules or regulations. 
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(l)(a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the 
employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good 
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a 
political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such communication shall be 
made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer reasonable opportunity to 
conect the waste or violation. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (l)(a) of this section, an employee communicates 
in good faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is 
lacking where the employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is 
malicious, false or frivolous. 
PMC does not dispute that it terminated the Plaintiff's employment, but takes issue with the 
remaining elements of the prima facie case with respectto either of the Plaintiff's "government 
waste" and/or "safety issues" theories. 
a. The Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity. 
Under the Whist1eblower's Act, activity is protected if an employee "communicates in 
good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of1aw, rule or regulation .... " IDAHO CooEANN. § 6-2104(1)(a) (2007). 
First, the Plaintiff is unable to show the existence of any waste of public funds, property or 
manpower. Mr. Van claimed PMC lost revenue because the Life Flight helicopter was not ready 
to "respond at a moment's notice" as portrayed in its advertisement. (Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. at 30.) 
However, while the Plaintiff expressed concerns that the helicopter was not always airworthy, he 
provided no evidence that the Life Flight helicopter actually missed a flight or that PMC lost 
revenue because the helicopter was unable to fly. 
Mr. Van further argued that PMC wasted taxpayer dollars by not incorporating his 
recommendations regarding the maintenance contract ("COMP contract') in connection with the 
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possible procurement of an Agusta 109 E helicopter from Agusta Aerospace Corporation. (I d. at 
14.) The Plaintiff"felt that the COMP contract was unworkable as far as securing assets to pay 
Agusta for certain parts. He advised the head of Customer Service for Agusta ofhis concerns 
and received assurances that things would be worked out. When it came time to sign the 
contract, Agusta's representative would not put the assurances in writing." (Jd.) However, PMC 
ultimately detennined that the agreement was satisfactory for the hospital, and the Plaintiff has 
not been able to show that PMC wasted taxpayer dollars because it did not make his desired 
changes to the COMP contract. The affidavit of Pamela Holmes indicates that Agusta bas 
provided all parts needed for repair or replacement and no warranty issues have even been 
nullified by Agusta because a mechanic was not factory-trained, as Mr. Van feared. (See Aff. of 
Pamela K. Holmes, ,[113-14, Aug. 3, 2007.) 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff cannot show that PMC violated any law, rule or regulation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the Whistleblower Act does not apply to 
violations, or suspected violations, of a public employer's internal policies. Mallonee v. Idaho, 
139 Idaho 615, 619-20, 84 P.3d 551, 555-56 (2004). The Plaintiff claimed be bas proven he 
engaged in protected activity by raising sixteen (16) "safety issues." (See Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. at 
3~7.) However, none of these "safety issues" implicate a law, rule or regulation. Instead, the 
Plaintiff's allegations pertain to Life Flight internal policies and procedures. Therefore, none of 
a11eged safety violations trigger activity protected by the Whistleblower Act. The Plaintiff's 
allegations regarding safety issues more aptly pertain to pilot management practices and involve 
the Plaintiff's issues of trust with pilots. Potential violations of Federal Aviation Regulations 
Memorandum DerisiGo and Order 
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C 




were investigated and no violation oflaw was found. As such, these incidents do not rise to the 
level of a violation of a law, rule or regulation. 
b. The Plaintiff cannot provide evidence that be was terminated because 
he engaged in protected activity. 
Even if the Plaintiff had demonstrated that be engaged in protected activity, he still is 
unable to establish the nexus requirement of the prima facie case. Pursuant to tbe 
Whistleblower's Act, the Plaintiff must show that he was terminated because he communicated 
"the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected 
violationofalaw,ruleorregulation .... " lDAHOCODEANN. § 6-2104(1)(a)(2007). As 
mentioned, there is no dispute that PMC took an adverse action against the Plaintiff by ftring 
him. However, the evidence shows that PMC's motivation to terminate the Plaintiff's 
employment was related to his inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his 
colleagues and his inability to foster a positive team environment The record shows that the 
Plaintiff had severe distrust issues with the pilots and was unable to accept solutions unless those 
solutions were his own suggestions. The Plaintiff's attitude led to dysfunction within the Life 
Flight program, and the wasting and safety issues he raised did not occur contemporaneously 
with his termination. 
3. Whether the Plaintiff's termination was a breach of public policy, breach of 
contract and/or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealin2.. 
In his Memorandum in Response, the Plaintiff faj}s to set forth any facts to support his 
claims for breach of pubHc policy, breach of contract and/or breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The Plaintiff states: "Sufficient evidence ... exists to create a genuine issue of 
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material fact as to the hospital's breach of public policy, the breach of their implied contract of 
employment ... and their breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Mem. 
in Resp. to Summ. J. at 31.) 
The Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his tennination falls within a recognized public 
policy exception. "The public policy exception bas been held to protect employees who refuse to 
commit unlawful acts, who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal 
rights or privileges." Sorensen v. Comm. Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). 
There is no evidence that PMC asked the Plaintiff to "com:rnit unlawful acts" and that he refused 
to do so, that he was fired for "performing important public obligations," or that he was 
terminated for "exercise[ing] certain legal rights or privileges." Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has determined it was not a violation of public policy to terminate an employee for 
disclosing documents allegedly showing environmental pollution, as long as that disclosure was 
unrelated to the termination. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178-79, 16 P.3d 272,276-77 
(2000). This Court has already determined that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a nexus between 
his concerns regarding the Life Flight program and his termination. 
Moreover, it is clear from the record that the Plaintiff was an at-will employee and could 
be terminated for any reason. It is also clear that the Plaintiff was aware of his status. (Ex. A, 
Dep. of Mark C. Van, attached to McFarlane Aff.) There is no evidence that PMC breached any 
contract As such, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to this basis is hereby 
GRANTED. 
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B. Whether to grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
As this Court has granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and further 
determined that the Plaintiff's concerns regarding the COMP contract were unfounded, this 
Court hereby DENIES the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. 
C. Whether the Defendants are entitled to costs and fees. 
PMC also asserted it is entitled to an award of the costs and fees it incurred in 
successfully defending against the Plaintiffs claim under IC § 6-2101 and against the Plaintiffs 
claims for breach of express and implied contract terms. 
1. Whistleblower claim. 
Idaho Code § 6-21 ot provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs to an employer 
if the court determines that the action was brought without basis in law or fact While this Court 
has determined that the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower 
Act, Mr. Van did not bring his Wbistleblower action "without basis in law or fact." As such, this 
Court declines to award attorney fees to the Defendants on this basis. 
2. Breach of contract claims. 
PMC also argued it is entitled to an award of the attorney fees it incurred in defending 
against the Plaintiffs breach of contract claims, including his claims for breach of express and 
.. 6-2107. Award of attorneys' fees and costs to employer- Adion without basis in law or fact.- A court may 
also order that reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if the court determines that an 
action brought by an employee under this chapter is without basis in law or in fact. However, an employee shall not 
be assessed attorneys' fees under this section if. after exercising reasonable and diligent efforts after filing a suit. the 
employee files a voluntary dismissal concerning the employer, within a reasonable time after determining ~the 
employer would not be liable for damages. 
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implied contract terms and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith. Pursuant to IC § 
12-120(3), attorney fees are recoverable in an action on a contract for personal services. That 
section states in pertinent part "In any civil action to recover on ... [a] contract relating to ... 
services ... , the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs., Furtbetmore, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically determined that the employer is entitled to recover fees incurred in defending against 
claims for an implied contract, inc1uding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Atwood v. 
W. Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234,240-41, 923 P.2d 479,485-86 (1996) ("(A]ctions on employment 
contracts are subject to the attorney fee provisions of I. C.§ 12-120(c)." When an employer 
successfully defends against claims for breach of express and implied contract terms, including 
the claim for violation of the implied covenant of good faith, such employer should be granted 
attorney fees.) 
As this Court has determined the Plaintiff's termination was not a violation of contract or 
a breach of public policy or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Defendants, pursuant 
to IC § 12-120(3), are entitled to an award of those costs and fees reasonably and necessarily 
incurred in defending against such claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff failed to fulfill the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, requiring a dismissal of the Plaintiff's tort claims, including those for emotional 
distress. Furthennore, the Plaintiff failed to meet the prima facie case of the Whistleblower's 
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Act by failing to show that PMC committed any waste of public funds, property or manpower or 
violated any law, rule or regulation. Further, the Plaintiff was unable to establish the nexus 
requirement since he failed to show he was terminated because he communicated the existence 
of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a 
law, rule or regulation. In addition, this Court determined that the Plaintiff was unable to 
demonstrate that his tennination was a breach of public policy, breach of contract and/or a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
This Court also DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration since the Defendants 
prevailed on the summary judgment motion, and the Plaintiff's concerns regarding the COMP 
contract were unfounded. 
Lastly, the Plaintiff failed to state any cause of action ag-.Unst the individually named 
Defendants. There is no evidence that any of these individuals were Mr. Van's employer under 
the Whistleblower's Act, that any of them entered into a contract with the Plaintiff or that the..-;e 
Defendants were acting outside of the course and scope of their employment. As such, these 
Defendants are not liable to "Mr. Van. This Court hereby DISMISSES the individually named 
Defendants, including Does I~ X. 
The Defendants are entitled to reasonable costs and fees pursuant to IC § 12-120(3). 
However, this Court declines to grant fees under I C § 6-2107 since it determined that the 
Plaintiff did not bring his Whistleblower action "without basis in law or fact'' 
The Plaintiffs Complaint against all the Defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice, 
and the Defendants are awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for attorney's fees and court costs 
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reasonably incurred. Counsel for the Defendants shall submit an appropriate memorandum of 
costs and judgment for this Court's signature. The jury trial set to commence February 5, 2008, 
is vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. -Dated this 3" day of October, 2007. 
Copies to: 
Nick Nielson 
Paul D. McFarlane 
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In the Supreme Court ofthe State of Idaho 
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011 
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053 
RESPONDENT POR1NEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA M. OLSSON IN SUPPORT OF PMC'S MOTION 
TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were filed by counsel for Respondent on July 2, 2013. Therefore, 
good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed 
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped October 17, 2005; 
2. Judgment, file-stamped November 9, 2007. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD be and hereby is, DENIED in part, without prejudice, as the documents listed below do not 
bear a legible file stamp. 
1. Answer to Complaint. 
2. Memorandum Decision and Order 
DATED this ..:if:day of July, 2013. 
cc: Counsel ofRecord 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE 
RECORD- Docket No. 38793-2011 
'j 
MAR.23.2006 5:26PM 
t David E. Gabert, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
r. s . B . #3 2 a 5 
845 West Center, Suite C 
1?.0. Box 4267 
Po~atello, Idaho 83205-4267 
Telephone: (208) 233-9560 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NO. 3583 P. 4 
Response due ~1/1/tXe 
l,../ Calendared.._ _____ _ 
~ ... Tlckloo _______ _ 
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PETER D. McDERMOTT 
) 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER 1 PAT ) 
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, ) 
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director,) 
GARY ALZOLA, Director of ) 
Operations, RON FERGIEr Chief ) 
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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JtJ'RY TRIAL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff 1 MARK VAN, by and through his attorney, 
David E. Gabert, Esq., and for cause of action against Defendants 
alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
I. 
At all times material herein, Plaintiff has been a resident of 
the City of Pocatello, County of Eannock, State of Idaho. 
II. 
At all times material herein, Defendant, PORTNBUF MEDICAL 
CENTER/ is a Public Governmental Entity doing business in the City 
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of Pocatello, County of Bannock, State of Idaho. 
current address is ae follows: 
Portneuf Medical Center, West 
651 Memorial Drive 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
II!. 
NO. 3583 P. 5 
Defendant's 
At all times material herein, Defendant, PAT HERMANSON, is the 
Adminstrator of Portneuf Medical Center, and is ultimately 
responsible for the decision to terminate employment. Pat 
Hermanson is also a resident of the county of ~annock, State of 
Idaho. 
IV. 
At all times material herein, Defendant, PAM HUMPHREY, is the 
Program Director of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Office of 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER. Ms. Humphrey is also a resident of the 
County of Bannock, State of Idaho. 
v. 
At all times material herein, Defendant, GARY ALZO~, is the 
Director of Operations of the EMS Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL 
CENTER. Mr. Alzola is als'o a resident of the County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho. 
VI. 
At all times material herein, Defendant, RON FERGIE, is the 
Chief Pilot/Safety Officer of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER. Mr. Fergie is aleo a resident 
of the County of Bannock, state of Idaho. 
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'Vli. 
At all times material herein, Defendant, BARRY NIELSON, is a 
Pilot for the EMS Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER. Mr. Nielson 
is a resident of the county of Power, State of Idaho. 
VIII. 
At all timee material herein, DOES I-X are officers, 
directors, employees or agents of Portneuf Medical Center. 
JURISDIC'l'ION AND VENUE 
IX. 
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference 
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered I 
through VIIl above. 
X. 
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction to hear the instant 
matter pursuant to section 6-2101 et seg. of the Idaho Code, and 
venue is proper in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the 
County of Bannock. 
FACTUAL BASES FOR CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
XI, 
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference 
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered l 
through 2C above. 
XII. 
In 1984, Plaintiff, Mark Van, began working for Freedom 
Helicopters, a private corporation contracted with then Bannock 
Medical Center to provide Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
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. helicopter support. In 1985, Portneuf Medical Center, then Bannock 
Regional Medical Center, became the operator of 'EMS flight 
services. Plaintiff was contracted by Bannock Regional center as 
the Director of Maintenance for the EMS flight services. rn 1986, 
Plaintiff became a full-time employee of Bannock Regional Medical 
Center as the Director of Maintenance for the EMS flight services 
under its l35 Air Carrier certificate. EMS provides emergency 
regional medical helicopter flight services for patients of 
l?ortneuf Medical Center and operates under the name uLite Flight." 
XIII. 
On or about the weekend of October 30/31, 2004, Greg Stoltz, 
a Life Flight mechanic inspected the Life Flight helicopter and 
found the aircraft covered with ice and snow. Mr. Stoltz went to 
the maintenance shop to notify the pilot, Defendant, Barry Nielson, 
about the condition of the aircraft, specifically to indicate that 
it was unairworthy; however, he was unable to contact Mr. Nielson. 
Mr. Stoltz thereafter returned from the maintenance shop less than 
five (5) minutes later to witness Mr. Nielson lifting off from the 
helipad in direct violation of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 
135.227, and causing a potential safety hazard by flying with ice 
on the main rotors by creating an imbalance in the rotors, and/or 
by flinging ice outward from the rotors into the public space. 
XIV. 
Mr. Stolt;;: notified Plaintiff of the incident on Monday, 
November 1st, 2004. Plaintiff then reported the incident to 
Defendant, Ron Fergie, who represented that he would conduct an 
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investigation. After Mr. Fergie spoke with Mr. Stoltz about the 
incident, Plaintiff spoke with . Mr. Fergie who said that the 
incident was 11 nothing." 
XV. 
In response to the apparent lack of concern exhibited by Ron 
Fergie about this incident, Plaintiff sent to Ron Fergie and to 
Defendant, Gary Alzola, a set of recommendations for protecting the 
aircraft in inclimate weather to ensure maximum operational 
readiness and safety. 
XVI. 
Nevertheless, over the course of the winter of 2004/2005, the 
maintenance department found several instances of · ice on the 
helicopter's main rotor blades underneath the main rotor blade 
covers. Since ice should not develop underneath the blade covers 
if the blades have been properly de-iced, Plaintiff deduced that 
the pilots had been replacing the blade covers without first 
cleaning the blades of ice and snow, thereby causing the aircraft 
to be unairworthy. This deduction was later confirmed after Ron 
Fergie later admitted this practice to J?laintiff. Since the 
aircraft is intended to be ready at a rnoment 1 s notice to respond to 
an emergency, this practice was unacceptable as it would either 
delay takeoffs in order to clean the blades or would otherwise 
endanger the safety of patients and of the flight staff, and 
Plaintiff reminded Mr. Fergie that he had recommended the previous 
autumn that the blades be wiped down before installing the main 
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rotor blade covers to avoid an unairworthy condition when the 
temperature dipped below freezing. 
XVII. 
Plaintiff thereafter spoke with junior pilot, Chad Waller, who 
was present on one ot the occasions when the rotor blades covers 
had been installed over wet and snow covered blades. Mr. Waller 
informed Plaintiff that after he had started to wipe off the blades 
to install the main rotor blade covers that Mr. Fergie had rebuked 
him telling him that it was not necessary since the snow comes 
right off when the covers are installed. Accordingly, Mr. Waller 
went along with Mr. Fergie's orders, despite the fact that he knew 
that this was not the case. 
XV!II. 
On February l, 2005, Plaintiff drafted a written report wbich 
'~s sent to Gary Alzola and Pam Rumphrey. The report cited the 
safety problems with pilots replacing rotor blade covers over wet, 
or snow, or ice covered rotor blades. Mr. Alzola and Ms. Humphrey 
responded that Mr. Fergie had done nothing wrong and that this 
practice did not pose a safety issue. 
XIX. 
on February 25, 2005, Earry Nielson accosted Plaintiff and 
implicity threatened him for reporting the October, 2004, incident 
involving his flight with ice on the main rotor blades, 
XX. 
On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with 
Mr. Alzola, Ms. Humphrey, and Mr. Fergie. Mr. Alzola, who was 
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noticeably emotionally upset at the time, told Plaintiff that only 
a pilot could take an aircraft out of service and that it was not 
his (Plaintiff's) responsibility to do so. Mr. Alzola also 
informed Plaintiff that the issue of flying with ice on the rotor 
blades was between the FAA and the pilots and that it was none of 
his business. In addition, Mr. Fergie informed the group present 
that Mr. Nielson had not flown with ice on the rotor blades in 
October of 2004, but that Mr. Stoltz had told him that there was 
only frost on the blades, despite the fact that flying with frost 
on the rotor blades would still constitute a violation of FAR 
135.227(a). 
XXI. 
In response to this meeting, Plaintiff confronted Mr. Stoltz 
about the October incident, and Mr. Stoltz confirmed that he had 
actually witnessed ice and snow on the main rotor blades when Mr. 
Nielson lifted off. Plaintiff thereafter updated his existing 
safety policy regarding taking an aircraft out of service, in 
reference to FAR 43. :Ll. The updated policy provided that while the 
mechanics would not take an unairworthy aircraft out of service, 
they would make an entry into the aircraft logbook declaring that 
the aircraft is unairworthy and would notify dispatch that the 
aircraft was unairworthy. 
XXII. 
Plaintiff attempted to raise several safety issues in a Life 
Flight meeting conducted ·on March 24, 2005. Since Mr. Fergie was 
not present at the meeting, Ms. Humphrey, who was p~esent, 
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indicated she would call a special unscheduled safety meeting to 
address Plaintiff's concerns a few days later. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff sent e-mails to most of the Life Flight nurses and 
paramedics, as well as to Mr. Fergie and Ms. Humphrey notifying 
them of the specific issues he wanted to raise at the safety 
meeting. 
XXIII. 
On April 4, 2005, at a Human Resources meeting, Ms. Humphrey 
told Plaintiff that she had no intention of calling a safety 
meeting, telling him that the issue had already been dealt with, 
and accusing Plaintiff of merely attempting to embarrass Mr. 
Fergie. 
XXIV, 
On April 20/ 2005, Plaintiff was terminated as an employee of 
Portneuf Medical Center. In his termination letter prepared by Pam 
Humphrey and Dale Mapes, Plaintiff was accused of being "unable to 
maintain positive interpersonal relations with [his] colleagues", 
and failing to 11 foster a positive team environment. 11 Plaintiff 
alleges that the only bases for such accusations relate directly to 
the fact that he had reported FAR violations and related misconduct 
of his f~llow employees as they pertained to safety and operational 
readiness of Life Flight aircraft. 
COUNT l 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
XXV. 
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference 
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each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered r 
through XXIV above. 
XXVI. 
Plaintiff alleges as a result of the foregoing conduct of 
Defendants, as described hereinabove, that his employment was 
terminated in violation of Section 6-2101 et se~., of the Idaho 
Code, and contrary to public policy, because he had reported in 
good faith the existence of waste of public funds and/or violations 
or suspected violations of the law, and that, as such, Plaintiff is 
entitled to a claim for wrongful termination of employment. 
COUNT II 
BREACH OF CON'l'AAC'l' 
XXVII. 
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference 
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered I 
through XXVI above. 
xxvrrr, 
Plaintiff alleges that he was employed subject to a contract 
o.f employment with Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER. That he was 
entitled to the terms, conditions, and protection of his employment 
contract with Defendant, and that as a result of the conduct of 
Defendants, as described hereinabove, the policies and procedures 
of Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, were violated with regards 
to Plaintift's employment, and that Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL 
CENTER, breached its policies and procedures in terminating 
Plaintiff from his employment and further breached the implied 
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contract of good faith and fair dealing in its decision to 
terminate ~laintiff's employment. 
DAMAGES 
XXIX. 
~laintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference 
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered r 
through XXVIII above. 
XXX. 
Plaintiff alleges that as a direct and/or proximate result of 
the conduct of Defendants herein, as hereinbefore described, 
Plaintiff sustained damages including lost wages and benefits, 
decreased earning capacity, costs required to relocate in order to 
secure new income, and emotional distress and suffering, all in an 
amount to be proven at the trial of this matter. 
:XXXI. 
Plaintiff further a~leges that he is entitled to injunctive 
relief to restrain Defendants from continued violations of FAR 
safety regulations under the provisions of Idaho Code, Section 6-
2106. 
XXXII. 
Plaintiff further alleges that he is entitled to reinstatement 
of h:i.s position, including the reinstatement of full wages and 
benefits and seniority rights under the provisions of Idaho Code, 
Section 6-2106. 
XXXIII. 
Plaintiff further alleges that he is entitled to an award of 
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attorney's fees and costs for bringing the instant cau::le of action, 
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 6-2106, and Section 12-121 1 in an 
amount to be proven at the trial of this matter. In the event this 
matter ls uncontested, Plaintiff alleges that his attorney's fees 
will be FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00). 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in the above-entitled 
matter 1 pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that upon examination into this 
matter as required by law that an Order be issued by the Court for 
the following: 
1. For an award of special and general compensatory damages 
in the such reasonable amount as may be awarded by the jury for the 
wrongful conduct of Defendants 1 as hereinbefore describedi and 
2. For injunctive relief as set forth hereinabove; and 
3. For reinstatement of his position, wages, benefits, and 
seniority rights, as set forth above; and 
4. For an award of Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as set forth 
abovei and 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this ~day of October 1 2005. 
DQ~~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Bannock 
I, MARK VAN, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says 
as follows: 
That he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he 
has read the above and foregoing COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL, knows the contents thereof and that the same are true to the 
best of his knowledge. 
Mark Van 
Plaintiff 
}~fi-SUBSCRIBBD AND SWORN TO before me this --~--~ day of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MOFFA7T, THOMAS _ 
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PORTNEUF MED lCAL CENTER, PAT 
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, 
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director, 
GARY ALZOLA, Director of Operations, 
RON FERGIE, Chief Pilot/Safety Officer, 
BARRY NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES 1-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2005-4053 OC 
JUDGMENT 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants PortneufMedica1 Center, Pat 
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzo1a, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson havjng come before 
the Court, and the matter having been fully briefed by the respective parties and oral argument 
having been heard thereon; and 
The Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision, Order and Judgment on October 30, 2007; 
1T IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment on 
Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby entered in favor of Defendants PortneufMedical Center, Pat 
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary A1zo1a, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson and against the 
JUDGMENT-1 BOI_MT2:669128.1 
00068J;h/0; 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs causes of action are dismissed as against Defendants PortneufMedical 
Center, Pat Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzola, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants PortneufMedical Center, Pat 
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzola, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson be awarded their costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in defending this action pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l), l.R.C.P., the 
amount of which will be determined following submission of an appropriate Memorandum of 
Costs as provided under Rule 54(d)(5), l.R.C.P. -
DATED this J day ofNover:tber, 2007. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _f-~day ofNovember, 2007, I caused a tme 
and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nick L Nielson 
NIELSON LAW OFFICE 
I 20 North I 2th A venue, Suite 7 
Post Office Box 6159 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-6159 
Facsimile (208) 232-0048 
Patricia M. Olsson 
Paul D. McFarlane 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile (208) 345-2000 
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